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A. STi i1 TEMENT OF THE CASE 
i. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a District Court's judgment granting Respondents' Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment against the Appellant on the issue of failure to commence proceedings 
against the Respondents within the six month time frame established by Idaho Code § 45-510 
and also a judgment granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment on Appellant's 
quantum meruit cause of action. Further, after granting judgment, the District Court denied 
Appellant his attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(d)(1) and granted 
the Respondents' attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § § 12-120(3), 12-121 and 
LR.C.P. 54( d)(1). 
ii. Course of Proceedings 
The District Court entered an order granting Defendant's second motion for partial 
summary judgment on January 21, 2011 in favor of the Respondents and against the Appellant. 
See Augmented Record ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST KASCO OF IDAHO, LLC. Thereafter a judgment was 
entered with regard Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment establishing that each of 
Appellant's three mechanic's liens were lost and unenforceable against the Respondents' interest 
in the subject property. (Augmented Record Partial Summary Judgment Against KASCO of 
Idaho. LLC file-stamped January 21,2022) On March 8, 2011, the District Court entered an 
order granting Defendant's Third Motion for Summary Judgment against KASCO. (Augmented 
Record Partial Summary Judgment Against KASCO of Idaho. LLC file-stamped March 8, 2011) 
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Thereafter a Rule 54(b) certificate was issued on September 18, 2012, by the District Court and 
certifying its partial summary judgment orders as final. (Record S. Ct. Docket No. #40474-2012 
pgs.36-37). 
On November 27,2013, the District Court entered judgment against the Appellant and in 
favor of the Respondent for costs in the amount of $608.25 and attorney fees in the amount of 
$33,306.00 pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. (Id at 49-50). It is from these 
orders and or judgments that the Appellant now appeals. 
iii. Statement of Facts 
On or about June 20, 2008, the Appellant entered into a contract with Defendant 
Monument Heights, LLC. which included as its members Roger Glessner, Richard Abbey, Keri 
Abbey, Chad Ross, Brenny Ross, and Chad Johnson. (Record S. Ct. Docket No. #39244-2011 
Volume II pge 284.) (Augmented Record, SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAFIT OF CASEY S. 
KRIVER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAN'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST KASCO OF IDAHO, LLC. file-stamped January 11, 2011, Pg.2, para 
3.) Thereafter, on or about June 20, 2008, Appellant provided professional services, performed 
labor and/or supplied materials for Monument Heights, LLC. (Augmented Record, 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
KASCO ofIdaho, LLC file-stamped December 16,2012 pge 2, para 2.) 
On August 1, 2008, the Respondents made a loan to Monument Heights, LLC, for 
improvements on three parcels of real property located in Kootenai County (hereinafter "Subject 
Property") and secured said loan by way of Deed of Trust which was recorded on August 6, 
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2008, thereby acquiring an interest in the property which is the subject of Appellant's liens. 
(Augmented Record, Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second Motion 
for Summary Judgment Against Kasco ofIdaho, LLC, file-stamped December 16, 201 0, Page 2). 
Thereafter, a Quitclaim Deed transferring the Subject Propeliy by the Respondents (50% 
interest) and Sage Holdings, LLC (50% interest) to all the individuals of Monument Heights, 
LLC was recorded on August 19,2008 with regard to the Subject Property. (Augmented Record, 
Affidavit of Hemy D. Madsen in Support of Kasco's Brief in Objection to Defendants' Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment, file-stamped January 3,2011, Exhibit 1) This Quitclaim Deed, 
according to the chain of title, appeared to effectively remove the Respondents' interest in the 
Subject Property. 
The Appellant then ceased providing services, performing labor and/or supplying 
materials to Monument Heights, LLC, on September 13, 2008. (Augmented Record, 
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
KASCO ofIdaho, LLC file-stamped December 16,2012 pge 2, para 2.) On November 25, 
2008, the Appellant caused three (3) mechanics liens to be recorded with the Kootenai County 
Recorder. (Record S. Ct. Docket No. 39244-2011, Vol. II pgs. 285-294) On May 11, 2009, 
Appellant commenced a lien foreclosure action to foreclose its mechanic's liens. However, the 
Appellant did not include the Respondents in his Complaint at the time of filing, as it did not 
appear they were in the chain of title based on the Quitclaim Deed recorded on August 19,2008. 
(Record S. Ct. Docket No. 39244-2011, Vol. I, pgs 148-184; Augmented Record, Affidavit of 
Hemy D. Madsen in Support of Kasco's Brief in Objection to Defendants' Second Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, file-stamped January 3, 2011, Exhibit ;1 and Affidavit of Keith Sin:uTIS file-
stamped January 18,2011) 
On October 15, 2010, the Appellant filed a Fifth Amended Verified Complaint and 
asserted two causes of action against the Respondents: (1) foreclosure of his mechanic's lien and 
(2) quantum meruit. (Record S. Ct. Docket No. 39244-2011, Vol. II pgs. 270-294.) However, 
the true nature of the Respondents' involvement with regard count 2 never materialized as the 
District Court granted summary judgment on 1122/11, just one month after discovery 
commenced against the Respondents. 
Upon receipt of Respondent's briefing with regard Respondent's yd motion for summary 
judgment, a deposition was scheduled for Roger Glessner, acting manager and overseer of the 
construction with regard the Monument Heights Project in order to meet the allegations of 
Respondent's motion. (Record S. Ct. Docket No. #40474-2012 ROA Report entry dated 2-8-11) 
Even though Appellant requested a continuance in order to receive the transcript of the 
deposition of Roger Glessner to support Appellant's contention that Respondent through 
Independent Mortgage, via Casey Krivor for Respondent, was controlling the construction and 
therefore subjecting Respondent to quantum meruit, and therefore good cause showing, the Court 
denied said continuance. 
Furthermore, Appellant had submitted affidavits and briefing in objection to said third 
motion for summary judgment but, although Respondent acknowledged receipt of the same and 
the clerk of the district court acknowledged receipt of the same, the clerk did not get the 
documents into the Repository record until 1/22111-the day of the hearing on the third motion 
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for summary judgment an did not get the documents to the court as promised before the hearing. 
Thereafter, the transcript of Roger Glessner became available on 1/24/2011(Record S. Ct. 
Docket No. #40474-2012 ROA Report entry dated 1124/11). As a result of the foregoing, the 
court did not take into consideration the briefing of the Appellant nor affidavits in support and 
granted Respondents third motion for summary judgment. Because the appellate record is 
devoid of any affidavits and briefing with regard Appellant's opposition to Respondent's third 
motion for summary judgment, Appellant can only argue that the Court should not have entered 
an order granting Respondent's third motion for summary judgment without first giving 
Appellant opportunity to make a record and take into consideration Appellant's briefing and 
affidavits in support. 
Based upon the foregoing Therefore, Appellant limits its scope of appeal as to the 
foregoing issue to: Was it an abuse of the District Court's discretion to deny Appellant a 
continuance of the hearing on Respondents third motion for summary judgment and/or in failing 
to recess shortly to locate the briefing and affidavits in support of Appellant's objection before 
making its decision? 
B. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(1) Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Respondents on the 
basis that Appellant failed to join Respondents within the six (6) month requirement of Idaho 
Code § 45-510? 
(2) Was it an abuse of the District Court's discretion to deny Appellant a continuance 
of the hearing on Respondents third motion for summary judgment and/or in failing to recess 
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shortly to locate the briefing and affidavits in support of Appeliant's objection before making its 
decision? 
(3) Should Respondent have been awarded his attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§12-121 and LR.C.P. 54(e)(1)? 
(4) Should the Appellants be awarded their costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
LR.C.P. 54(d)(1) and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 on appeal? 
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court 
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. A & J Const. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 
682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." If the evidence reveals no disputed 
issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. 
Dist. No.2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-19, 918 P.2d 583,587-88 (1996). 
In making this detelmination, "all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the 
non-moving party." McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 (1991). 
Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Inferences that can 
reasonably be made from the record are made in favor of the non-moving party. Id. However, the 
non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence. Id . If the record raises neither a 
question of witness credibility nor requires weighing the evidence, then summary judgment 
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should be granted. Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410, 414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 
(1960). "The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a 
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case .... Badell 
v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)." ParkWest Homes, LLC v. Barnson, 
149 Idaho 603, 238 P.3d 203 (2010). 
Further this Court held in Parkwest Homes, that "on review, the interpretation of a statute 
is an issue of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free review." Id. citing Idaho Fair 
Share v. Idaho Public Utilities Comm'n, 113 Idaho 959, 961-62, 651 P.2d 107, 109-110 
(1988)(overruled on other grounds by J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 
849,820 P.2d 1206 (1991)). 
With regard to the standard of review as to the award of attorney fees, this Court has held 
that, "Awarding attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject to 
review for an abuse of discretion." Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 897, 104 P.3d 367, 371 
(2004). When this Court considers whether a trial court has abused its discretion, "the standard 
is 'whether the court perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries 
of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason.' " Magleby v. Gam, 154 ID 
194,296 P. 3rd 400, 403(Idaho 2013) citing Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529,284 P.3d 970, 
973 (2012) (quoting Read v. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364, 369, 209 P.3d 661, 666 (2009)). Further, 
see Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Props., LLC, 148 Idaho 638, 639-40, 227 P.3d 568, 569-70 




(1) The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to Respondents on 
the basis that Appellant failed to join Respondents within the six (6) month 
requirement of Idaho Code § 45-510. 
(a.) Did the Court apply the wrong standard of care as to Appellant's notice of 
who should be included with its initial complaint for foreclosure? 
It was Respondents' position at their second motion for summary judgment that 
Appellant was required to name Respondent in its foreclosure case prior to the expiration of 6 
months from the date of filing its liens as a result of the Deed of Trust which was recorded on 
August 6, 2008. It is Appellant's position that the subsequent recording of the Quitclaim Deed 
on August 19, 2008, transferred the property from the Respondents to Monument Heights, LLC, 
and or the subsequent recording by the Respondents caused confusion with the record of title and 
notice to the Appellant and therefore Appellant should be relieved from the 6-month requirement 
as a result. 
Because of said confusion of title at the hands of Monument Heights, LLC, and the 
Respondents, the Appellant further listed John and Jane Doe 1-100 to give everyone concerned 
adequate notice that the Appellant was reserving the right to amend its claim to include any and 
all unknowns who may have an interest in subject property. Further, because of the confusion of 
title and notice at the hands of Monument Heights, LLC and the Respondents, equity demanded 
denial of the Respondents' motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues as 
to material fact as to the confusion of title with regard subject property. 
- 14 -
The Respondents were not entitled to summary judgment on the Appellant's lien 
foreclosure claim because, at a minimum, the Affidavit of Hemy D. Madsen file-stamped 
January 3, 2011, created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the Appellant had notice as to any 
interest by to Respondents in the subject property due to the transfer of subject property by 
Respondents and Sage Holdings to all members of Monument Heights, LLC. (Augmented 
Record, Affidavit of Hemy D. Madsen in Support of Kasco's Brief in Objection to Defendants' 
Second Motion for Summmy Judgment, file-stamped January 3, 2011, Exhibit 1). Important in 
the arguments below is that the same individuals who entered into the Deed of Trust on August 
1, 2008 and which was recorded August 6, 2008, purportedly conveyed parcel I and Parcel II of 
subject property back to all the members of Monument Heights, LLC. (Augmented Record, 
Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendants' Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, file-stamped December 16, 2010, Page 2) 
Additionally, pursuant to I.C. § 55-606, Idaho is a race state with regard to transferring 
title to real property. The Quitclaim Deed from Respondents and Sage Holdings to all parties of 
Monument Heights, LLC transferred subject propeliy subsequent to the recording of the Deed of 
Trust. The statute states: 
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is conclusive against the 
grantor, also against everyone subsequently claiming under him, except a 
purchaser or encumbrancer, who in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, 
acquires a title or lien by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly 
recorded. 
I.C. § 55-606. The Quitclaim Deed from the Respondents to Sage Holdings to all parties of 
Monument Heights, LLC transferred the subject property subsequent to the recording of the 
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Deed of Trust. 
The District Court's adoption of the Respondents' argument that the lien did not include 
the Respondents and was therefore lost as to them is simply a technical argument made to avoid 
priority of the Appellant's liens, effectively depriving the Appellant reimbursement for 
professional services it performed, and labor and/or materials it supplied to the Subject Property, 
in effect unjustly emiching the Respondents. 
Striking down the liens would be contrary to case law stating that the requirements of the 
lien laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant to ensure that persons who 
perform labor on land are compensated for their work and that such work is not provided for free 
to the owner and/or the Respondents. Absent enforcement of the lien, the Respondents would 
benefit for the $140,378.00 dollars of work to improve what may be ultimately the Respondents' 
property through non-judicial foreclosure and sale of subject property if said sale proceeds fail to 
exceed the Respondents' note and deed of trust. 
Compensating the Appellant would further the purpose and goal of the lien statutes and is 
the equitable result. 
Because of the confusion of title at the hands of Monument Heights, LLC, and the 
Respondents, Appellant further listed in its Complaint John and Jane Does 1-100 to give all 
notice that the Appellant reserved the right to amend its claim to include all those unknowns who 
may have an interest in subject property. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part, 
states: 
Unknown Owners or Heirs as Parties. In all actions or proceedings to obtain 
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title or possession, or to remove adverse claim of title, or to quiet title, or for 
partition, or for sale, or for foreclosure of any encumbrance, or enforcement of 
any trust, or specific performance of any contract, or for any other disposition of 
any property, real, personal, or mixed, situated within the state of Idaho including 
choses in action either situated within or due or claimed to be due from persons, 
firms or corporations resident within the state of Idaho, persons may be made 
parties defendant either on the filing of the complaint, counterclaim or cross-
claim, as the case may be, or at any time thereafter by amendment thereof, by the 
name and description of unknown owners, or unknown heirs or unknown devisees 
of any deceased person, or by any of such designations. 
LR.C.P. 17(d). This Court has a consistent history of applying the long-established doctrine of 
liberal application of the rules and statutes underlying the lien foreclosure laws in order to, again, 
promote the legislative intent underlying the lien laws-that "[t]he purpose of these statutes is to 
compensate persons who perform labor upon or furnish material to be used in construction, 
alteration or repair of a structure." Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 850, 87 
P.3d 955, 959 (2004)(citing Barber v. Honorof, 116 Idaho 767, 768-69, 780 P.2d 89, 90-91 
(1989)). Therefore LR.C.P. 17(d) tolled the 6-month requirement. 
It is the Court's responsibility to interpret statutes and in doing so, "[it] must construe 
statutes so as to give effect to the legislative intent. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 575, 199 P.3d 
123, 150 (2008); Insight LLC v. Gunter, 2013, 2013 WL 1730149. Because Idaho's mechanic's 
lien statute is constitutionally mandated (Idaho Const., art. XIII, § 6) and intended to be liberally 
construed in favor of lien claimants (Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 41, 539 P.2d 590, 593 
(1975)), it is doubtful that the additional procedural hurdles ... were intended by the Legislature. 
Terra-W., Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 397, 247 P.3d 620, 624 (2010). 
Important to this analysis of whether the Respondents had notice of the lien foreclosure prior to 
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the statutory 6-month time period is the decision of the Court of who must be given notice and 
how they must be given notice. 
Idaho's mechanic's lien statute does not define when proceedings are commenced to 
enforce a lien, nor does it specify who is to be joined with regard enforcement of a mechanic's 
lien. Rule 17 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in conjunction with the mechanic's lien 
statute, as well as the facts in this case, support the Appellant's initial filing of proceedings for 
lien foreclosure and service of notice to Monument Heights, LLC, because Monument Heights, 
LLC was the owner (or reputed owner) of the subject property and/or appeared to be the 
contractual agent for the Respondents under the Deed of Trust entered August 1, 2008 for which 
service was accomplished through Monument Heights, LLC by the Appellant. 
Because of the confusion of title and statutory notice of interest in subject property at the 
hands of Monument Heights, LLC and the Respondents, equity demanded denial of the 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment because there were genuine issues as to material 
fact as to the confusion of title with regard subject property. 
In the case of Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 
683, 682 P.2d 635, 636 (Ct. App. 1984), this Court remanded Bonner back to the District Court 
to decide if lien claimant, Bonner Building Supply, had statutory notice of Standard Forest 
Product's interest in the property. Because the facts of the case created issues of material fact 
relating to whether Standard's ownership interest in the property was a matter of record, the 
Court determined that summary judgment was inappropriate. Similar factual questions exist in 
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this case. As in Bonner, equitable principles demanded that the Respondents' motion for 
summary judgment be denied. 
In making its decision that Appellant's liens lapsed with respect Respondents, the District 
Court went beyond that of what Appellant viewed as the last document in the line of title-the 
QUITCLAIM DEED and took into consideration previous recorded documents to interpret the 
meaning of the QUITCLAIM DEED. (TR. pgs. 18, In. 21 through pg. 22, In. 1) Further, in its 
decision, the court seemed to suggest that I.C. §55-606 required Appellant to procure a litigation 
guarantee before filing his complaint for foreclosure in the matter. However, IC §55-606 nor 
any of the case law surrounding said statute has ever required the same. In taking into 
consideration the previous documents, the Court imposed a higher standard of care as to notice 
than that which is required by I.C 55-606. 
The standard of care for one who is searching the record of title in preparation for 
imposition of a lien or lien foreclosure in conjunction with I.C. §45-510 and the legislature'S 
intent that the lien laws are to be liberally construed so that mechanics get paid for their services, 
is one of first impression having found no case directly on point with the circumstances as set out 
above. There is clearly equitable relief for one filing a foreclosure action where the title to the 
property was seemingly clear at the time of the filing of the complaint, as is in this case, as a 
result of the Quitclaim Deed and then later having found a potential interest to be litigated. 
Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Standard Forest Products, Inc. is an example of the foregoing 
proposition. 
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Furthermore, it was not the case that the matter was litigated to fruition and a judgment 
had to be set aside to deal with Respondent's interests. Respondents were included shortly after 
the filing of the complaint by Appellant and were also included in the complaint filed by ACI 
Northwest, Inc and would have been litigated had Respondent not filed their motion for 
summary judgment. (Record Volume I pgs 001-019. 
Recently in Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 280 P.3d 715 (2012), this Court ruled that: 
"The existence of ambiguity determines the standard of review of a lower court's 
interpretation of a contract or instrument." Mountainview Landowners Coop. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 139 Idaho 770, 772, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (2004) (citing Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ethington Fam. Trust, 137 Idaho 435, 437-38, 50 P.3d 450,452-
53 (2002)). "The legal effect of an unambiguous written document must be 
decided by the trial court as a question of law." Mountainview Landowners, 139 
Idaho at 772,86 P.3d at 486 (quoting Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, 857,673 
P.2d 1048, 1051 (1983)). "If, however, the instrument of conveyance is 
ambiguous, interpretation of the instrument is a matter of fact for the trier of fact." 
Id. Whether a document is ambiguous is a question of law. McKay v. Boise 
Project Bd. of Control, 141 Idaho 463, 469, 111 P.3d 148, 154 (2005) (citing City 
of Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,899 P.2d 411 (1995)." 
Further, this Court stated: 
"If the deed is ambiguous, the trier of fact must "determine the intent of the 
parties according to the language of the conveyance and the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction." Id. (citing Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 
P.3d 525, 530 (2003)). However, "[i]f the language of a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, the intention of the parties must be ascertained from the deed itself 
and extrinsic evidence is not admissible." Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d 
at 1238 (citing Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000)). "Ambiguity 
may be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting 
interpretati ons." 
Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d 785, 787 (2005) (citing Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 
65 P.3d at 530)." 
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The "QUITCLAIM DEED" relied upon by Appellant is not ambiguous and clearly 
purports to transfer all interest in and to parcels I and II to the members of Monument Heights, 
LLC. Even though the Deed contains generic language of information as to timber sales, the 
Deed still transfers said property to said members. The deed contains the identity of the parties, a 
description of the property to be conveyed, and words of conveyance and the language with 
regard timber sales does not condition the conveyance of the parcels in question. 
In making its decision, the Court took into consideration its own legal interpretation as to 
what it felt Appellant should have had notice of in making Appellant's decision as to who should 
be include in Appellant's action for lien foreclosure. The Court's decision that the liens lapsed 
with respect Respondents, was a result of misapplication of the law to the facts. (TR. pgs. 18, In. 
21 through pg. 22, In. 1) However, reliance of the QUITCLAIM DEED recorded by Respondent 
by Appellant was reasonable under the circumstances and within the standard of care required by 
I.e. 55-606. If the state of the law were as the District Court suggests, Appellant would be 
required to include everyone who had a previous interest in the property to insure that his liens 
would not lapse as to those parties. Further, such a standard would require extensive pleading 
and litigation as to whether including such persons was appropriate further subjecting Appellant 
liable for costs and fees for removal of the same. 
It is an unjust result to say that the parties who have created the confusion, by transferring 
the parcels in question back to Monument Heights, gain from said confusion as a result of lapse 
of said liens. Such result is clearly not within the legislative intent of the mechanics lien statute-
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that those who make improvements upon land get paid for said improvements nor the race 
statute. 
(b) The District Court erred when it granted summary judgment to Respondents on 
the basis that Monument Heights, LLC was not acting as agent under the DEED 
of Trust for purposes of service and notice requirements to Respondent and 
therefore Appellant failed to join Respondents within the six (6) month 
requirement of Idaho Code § 45-510. 
In its brief in support of its objection to Respondent's second motion for summary 
judgment, appellants asserted that Monument Heights, LLC was the appropriate party to sue in 
its representative capacity for the Respondents under the Deed of Trust which states: 
To protect the security of this Deed of Trust, Grantor (defined as Monument 
Heights, LLC, on page 1 of said Deed) agrees ... 3. To appear in and defend any 
action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights or 
powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; .. .in any such action or proceeding in which 
Beneficiary or Trustee may appear. 
(Augmented Record, Brief in Support of Objection to Jacobson's 2nd Motion for Summary 
Judgment file-stamped January 23, 2011; Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment Against Kasco of Idaho, LLC, file-stamped 
December 16, 2010, Exhibit 1) For the reasons above, the District Court erred in granting 
summary judgment to the Respondents because of these genuine issues of material fact. 
Recently in Edwards v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 300 P.3d 
43, (2013), this Court has set out the powers of agents listed in a Deed of Trust and the actions 
the lenders are responsible for with regard their agents. Specifically, as to agents listed in a Deed 
of Trust "[A]n agent is a person authorized to act for or in the place of the principal." (citation 
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omitted). Id at 49. Further this Court heid that "Any person who is sui juris and has capacity to 
affect his or her legal relationships by giving consent to a delegable act or transaction may 
authorize an agent to act for him or her with the same effect as if such person were to act in 
person." (Citation omitted)" Id at 49. 
In the case at hand, the lenders, Jacobson et. al (Respondent) as principal, had the 
authority to designate an agent to act in its behalf, and the actions of its agent, Monument 
Heights, LLC, were the actions of Respondent. "An agent can bind his principal by acts within 
the scope of his apparent authority." Id at 49 citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 151,408 
P.2d 810, 814 (1965). When Respondent created a contractual obligation for Monument 
Heights, LLC as it's agent to appear and defend in their stead, "Pursuant to the grant of authority 
by the principal, the agent is the representative of the principal and acts for, in the place of, and 
instead of, the principal." Id at 49 citing Am.Jur.2d Agency § 1 (2002). Therefore, it follows that 
Appellant's service of Monument Heights, LLC of its' complaint and Monument Height's 
answer therafter complies with the notice requirements ofIC 45-510. 
"Whether an agency relationship existed is a question of fact." Hilt v. Draper, 122 Idaho 
612, 616, 836 P.2d 558, 562 (Ct. App. 1992)(citing Adkison Corp. v. American Bldg. Co., 107 
Idaho 406, 690 P.2d 341 (1984)). Despite this, the cOUli granted summary judgment in favor of 
the Defendants. 
Pursuant to IRCP 56( c), the Appellant is entitled to a trial in this matter on all the issues 
herein as a matter of law because genuine issues of material fact exist regarding who was the 
actual party with interest in the subject property-was it Monument Heights, LLC pursuant to 
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the deed attached to the Affidavit of Hemy D. Madsen file-stamped January 3, 2011, or was it 
still the Respondents? Id. 
(2) Was it an abuse of the District Court's discretion to deny Appellant a 
continuance of the hearing on Respondents third motion for summary 
judgment and/or in failing to recess shortly to locate the briefing and 
affidavits in support of Appellant's objection before making its decision? 
A question of continuance is a ruling for the trial judge's discretion. Lambert v. Nw. Nat. 
Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780, 769 P.2d 1152 (Ct. App. 1989) However, if the District Court's denial 
of a motion for continuance deprives the applicant of a fundamentally fair trial, the appellate 
courts can overturn the ruling. Id. Here, the Appellant requested a continuance on the 
Respondents' third motion for summary judgment. The reason for the continuance was that the 
Appellant had yet to receive the deposition transcript of a key witness in the case, Roger 
Glessner. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, In. 8-11) Between the time Respondents filed their third motion for 
summary judgment, the date of the deposition of Glessner, and the hearing before the Court, it 
would have been virtually impossible for the Appellant to have the readied transcript. As any 
attorney knows, coordination of various parties and their counsel to attend a deposition can take 
time. Mr. Glessner's deposition commenced as quickly as the Appellant determined he had key 
knowledge of the case. The District Court disregarded the arguments of counsel when it abused 
its discretion by denied the motion for continuance. The District Court based its decision on the 
fact that it believed "the [appellant] failed to articulate good cause for failure to comply with the 
deadlines under Rule 56" and thus denied its motion to continue Respondents' third motion for 
summary judgment. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 40, In. 12) 
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(3) Should the Respondents have been awarded their costs and attorney fees 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. S4(d)(1) and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121? 
The District Court abused its discretion when it awarded the Respondents their attorney 
fees and costs under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. The judgment 
entered by the District Court on November 18,2012, awarded a total amount of $33,914.25 in 
attorney fees and costs against the Appellant. (Record These fees and costs were incurred as a 
result of the Respondents' active participation in litigation. However, the Respondents should 
have essentially been out of the litigation when they received their second partial summary 
judgment on March 18, 2011. They waited a year and a half to file for a Rule 54(b) judgment 
certifying their partial summary judgments as finaL Throughout this year and a half, the 
Respondents incurred substantial attorney fees without actually having any case to defend. The 
billings submitted to the District Court on October 2,2012, were twenty-five (25) pages long for 
what should have been a year's worth of time. Instead, the Respondents packed their billings 
with entries from December 24,2009 to October 2,2012. 
The District Court "is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor 
expended by the attorney under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures 
advanced by the attorney." Craft Wall of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 
P.2d 324,326 (Ct. App. 1985). However, the District Court did not undertake any examination 
in this case. It simply accepted the figures of the Respondents' counsel and awarded his amount 
in full. 
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The Court is to use an "exercise of reason" in determining the amount of attorney's fees 
owed, if any. BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298, 233 P.3d 
1216, 1220 (2010) reh'g denied (July 8, 2010). Here, the Court's exercise of reason involved 
The District Court must consider the factors in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) when determining the 
reasonableness of an attorney's fee award. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery 
Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d 475, 483 (2004). Importantly, the Respondents here failed 
this basic test when reviewing the factor under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G), which is "The amount 
involved and the results obtained." The Respondents requested the District Court award them 
over $30,000 for obtaining two summary judgments which cited only case law that was not novel 
or particularly difficult. 
The Respondents could have easily obtained their summary judgment motions at the 
onset without engaging in such a heavy amount of litigation. They took it upon themselves to 
attend depositions, engage in mediation (which did not even involve the Appellant) and conduct 
fact-finding for their defenses as it relates to the other parties in the consolidated case. 
"A court is permitted to examine the reasonableness of the time and labor expended by 
the attorney under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the 
attorney." Craft Wall ofIdaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324, 326 (Ct. 
App. 1985). In this case we see Respondents' counsel provide twenty-five pages of billing 
records. Respondents' counsel also succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in favor of his 
clients within a year's time. His request for fees in the amount of $32,466.00 is, on its face, 
excessive. Through an "exercise of reason," the Court determines the amount of attorney's fees 
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owed, if any. BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298, 233 P.3d 
1216, 1220 (2010), reh'g denied (July 8, 2010). 
a. There was no commercial transaction between Appellant and Respondents, 
and therefore their request for attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) should 
be denied. 
The issue between the Appellant and the Respondents related only to a priority of liens. 
The parties never engaged in a commercial transaction, which is required under I.C. § 12-120(3) 
in order to obtain attorney's fees. I.e. § 12-120(3) states the following: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The telm "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions 
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
"The critical test [of awarding attomey's fees] is whether the commercial transaction 
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit." Bingham v. Montane Res. Assocs., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 
987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999). In this case, the gravamen of the lawsuit is not a commercial 
transaction between the Appellant and Respondents but rather a question of law as to whether or 
not one's lien has priority over another. An award of attorney fees under I.e. 12-120(3) is 
inappropriate when there is no commercial transaction between a contractor and a lender. 
Hopkins NOlihwest Fund, LLC v. Landscapes Unlimited, LLC, 264 P.3d 379 (Idaho 2011). 
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Such is the case here, where the Appellant (a contractor) did not assert claims against the 
Respondents (the lenders) which related to any commercial transaction between the two. 
2. Appellant's arguments at the District Court relating to priority were brought 
under a reasoned basis in law, and were not brought frivolously or 
unreasonably. 
Rule l1(a)(1) allows for sanctions when an attorney signs a pleading contrary to the 
signer's reasonable belief that the pleading " .. .is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary 
delay or needless increase in the cost oflitigation." 
Under I.e. § 12-123, an award of attorney's fees to the Respondents would be allowed if 
the Appellant's actions were based on frivolous conduct. The statute defines such conduct as 
that which" ... obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil 
action [ or] it is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cmIDot be supported by 
a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." I.e. § 12-123. 
Such is not the case here. 
Here, the Appellant's arguments centered around a good faith attempt to show the need 
for a reversal of existing law. I.e. 45-510 states, in part: No lien provided for in this chapter 
binds any building, mining claim, improvement or structure for a longer period than six (6) 
months after the claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court within 
that time to enforce such lien ... 
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It was always the argument of the Appeiiant that the policy underlying the law of 
materialmen to get paid for the work they perform should extend Cont'! & Commercial Trust & 
Sav. Bank v. Pac. Coast Pipe Co., 222 F. 781, 788 (9th Cir. 1915), which was cited in 
Respondents' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, to circumstances where general 
contractors/debtors (Monument Heights) and lenders (Respondents) had control over the 
construction and payments therefrom via their agent, Casey Kriver. (See, Affidavit of Casey 
Krivor in Support of Jacobsons' 3rd Motion for Summary Judgment file stamped January 11, 
2011.) 
3. Even if the Respondents were a "prevailing party" under the law, they were 
not entitled to attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-121 because the Appellant's 
case was not brought frivolously. 
"Attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing party only if 'the Court determines that the 
action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.'" Youngblood v. 
Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 669, 182 P.3d 1199, 1203 (2008)(quoting Baker v. Sullivan, 132 Idaho 
746, 751, 979 P.2d 619,624 (1999)). 
Further, I.C. § 12-121 has been interpreted by the courts pursuant to Michalk v. Michalk 
220 P.3d 580, 591(2009) wherein the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
"An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to 
the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left 
with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation ... ( citation omitted) ... When 
deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I.e. § 12-121, the entire 
course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one 
legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the 
losing party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." 
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Upon being given notification that Respondents still had an interest in the property, the 
Appellant included them in the amended complaint and although after the six months the 
Appellant believed that Monument Heights, LLC was the authorized agent for Respondents as a 
result of the Deed of Trust. I.C. § 45-510 is vague as to who has to be joined within the six 
month time period. The Appellant was unaware of the Respondents when he filed his liens and 
proceeded with his foreclosure action, but believes his naming of Monument Heights was 
sufficient as they were clearly set out with the Deed of Trust as contractually responsible to 
appear for them, as I.C. § 45-510 does not specifically state who must be named. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing, there was a novel legal question before the Court: Was 
Monument Heights, as an agent for the Respondents, the correct person to name as a party in 
Appellant's lien foreclosure proceedings? We know that "[w]here a case involves a novel legal 
question, attorney fees should not be granted under I.e. § 12-121." Campbell v. Kildew, 141 
Idaho 640, 651,115 P.3d 731, 742 (2005). The District Court did not agree. Nor did it take any 
investigation at the hearing or through the pleadings to determine whether or not the 
Respondents' request was reasonable. It blindly accepted the figures of counsel without 
attempting to ascertain the true nature of the expenses. 
Further, Idaho's mechanic's lien statute does not define when proceedings are commenced 
to enforce a lien, nor does it specify who is to be joined with regard enforcement of a mechanic's 
lien. The Appellant believed that I.R.C.P. 17, in conjunction with the mechanic's lien statute as 
well as the facts in this case, supported the Appellant's filing of the amended complaint in these 
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proceedings for lien foreclosure and service of notice to the Respondents because of Monument 
Heights' ownership or reputed ownership, as a result of the Deed of Trust, of the subject 
property, and as such was the contractual agent for the Respondents. This theory of the 
Appellant was based on the Deed of Trust entered August 1, 2008 between those parties. 
Because of the confusion of title and statutory notice of interest in subject property at the 
hands of Monument Heights and the Respondents, the Appellant believed, and still does believe, 
equity required a legal determination as to the title of the subject property and whether having 
included Monument Heights in its initial filing fulfilled the requirement of including 
Respondents as Monument Heights was their agent pursuant to the Deed of Trust. Such question 
is novel as it has not been reviewed in such a manner before. 
4. The Respondents attorney's fees were and are excessive and did not relate to 
the priority of liens which is the reason they were brought into this litigation. 
Not waiving the arguments against denying attorney fees above, if any fees are 
authorized by law, the only fees set forth by the Respondents should have been those which 
specifically relate to answering the Appellant's Complaint, preparing their Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and obtaining their Rule 54(b) Final Judgment Certificate. Any other charges are 
outside the scope of this case's claims and are umeasonable and not suppOlied by law. The 
charges specifically relating to Respondents' above-mentioned defenses (answering the 
Complaint, filing a Motion for Summary Judgment and obtaining Rule 54(b) Certificate) amount 
to $6,027.00, not the $32,466.00 claimed by the Respondents. 
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As stated above the Supreme Court in Michalk stated that "an award of attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only 
when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, 
or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without foundation ... " The facts of this case do not 
rise to the level propounded by IRCP 54 or the above Court. 
A party's unnecessary expense in litigation is not awarded in attorney's fee awards and 
would appear to fall under the Court's "reasonableness" review standard. These Respondents 
engaged in unnecessary litigation which was in no way required in order to obtain the results 
they obtained. Awarding attorney's fees for exceptional costs is not only unfair, it falls directly 
outside the scope ofI.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(G). 
(4) Should the Appellants be awarded their costs and attorney fees pursuant to 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1) and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121 on appeal? 
Under I.C §12-121, the Appellant's attorney fees and costs are appropriate if the 
Appellant is successful with this appeal and if this Court makes a finding that the Respondents 
defended this appeal frivolously. See Gonzalez v. Thacker, 148 Idaho 879, 231 P.3d 524 (2009). 
The Respondent consistently misrepresented the record throughout the summary judgment and 
motions for reconsideration hearings. The District Court's abuse of its discretion caused the 
Appellant to appeal to this Court and incurred attorney fees and costs which were unnecessary 
had the District Court not abused its discretion. 
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Idaho Appellate Rule 40 provides for costs to a prevailing party at appeal. Additionally, 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 allows a party to request attorney fees and the Appellant so requests the 
opportunity to submit a memorandum and affidavit in support if this Court so orders it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court overturn the 
summary judgments entered in favor of the Respondents. At a minimum, the Respondents are 
not entitled to summary judgment on Appellant's lien foreclosure claim because an issue of 
material fact exists as to whether the lien foreclosure proceedings were brought against the 
parties for which Appellant had statutory notice and/or pursuant the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 17. In conjunction with the facts set out above Monument Heights, LLC was the 
contractual agent of the Respondents and by bringing the action against Monument Heights, LLC 
the action was brought against the Respondents. Further that pursuant to IRCP 17 and Terra W,. 
the proceeding was brought against Respondents based upon the contractual obligation of 
Monument Heights, LLC to appear and defend the action as well as give note under said Deed 
of Trust with regard any action brought affecting an interest in subject property. Lastly, 
summary judgment is inappropriate based on equitable principles as set out above. 
Further, that this Court set aside the Judgment awarding Respondent its attorney fees and 
costs and award the Appellant its attorney fees and costs for this appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§ 12-117, 12-121 andIAR40and41. 
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Respectfully submitted this 10th day of July, 2013 
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